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The history of technological advancement has taken few turns to 
compare with early national America. Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, 
given the historical circumstances, Americans began expansively re-
ferring to themselves (and others to them) as pioneers in the march of 
industrial progress. Indeed, within a few decades, Eli Whitney had 
introduced interchangeable musket parts, Oliver Evans had produced 
bold new theories of automation, and a circle of Massachusetts inventor-
industrialists had made the Waltham system of integrated production 
spectacularly successful. More significantly, perhaps, thousands of name-
less mechanics had begun to modify European patterns and processes, 
adapting them to the tastes of a new society and the demands of a new 
environment. This was more than industrialization. It was an associa-
tion between technology and culture, an association so intimate that it 
soon affected the very conception of the American character. Thus, there 
appeared that tantalizing phrase, "Yankee ingenuity," to prod and in-
spire generations of inventors and to set before the world a paradigm 
of industrial accomplishment. Historians have never ceased wondering 
why. It is the purpose of this paper to examine their collective discourse 
on the subject and to suggest a framework for bringing their observations 
together. 
The historiography of early American technology may be broken 
down into roughly four kinds of analysis.1 The first, the least popular, 
and yet certainly not the least plausible is the argument that American 
toolmen lifted their ideas part and parcel from Europe in general and 
Great Britain in particular. In the matter of interchangeable parts, for 
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example, Eli Whitney's once-sure claim of paternity has been effectively 
disputed by Robert Woodbury, who simply called attention to the ante-
cedent developments of Bentham and Brunei in England and Le Blanc 
in France.2 Woodbury's is an important kind of corrective to bear in 
mind. Still, some rather difficult questions remain unanswered. For, 
even with the simplest case of technological "transfer," there arises 
novelties of application and use. It is true that wooden pully blocks 
were assembled interchangeably for the Royal Navy as early as 1793; but 
it is also true that Samuel Colt's Exposition of interchangeable parts 
manufacturing astonished the British in 1851. If Americans borrowed 
their ideas, they made good use of what they borrowed—such, at least, is 
the basic position of those who have seen American technology as unique. 
These historians have looked away from Europe for their answers, and 
with varying degrees of success, they have turned up useful ideas. In 
most cases, they have found the key influences to be endemic to the 
American situation itself: its particular patterns of production and 
distribution, its peculiar social and cultural institutions, or its singular 
physical environment. 
The "economic school" of technological history has been, until quite 
recently, essentially a mode of assumption. Historians accepted it as 
given that technology developed in direct response to capital accumula-
tion and labor scarcity. Accordingly, their individual interpretations con-
fined themselves to the mundane questions of how capital was accumu-
lated and why it was invested in this or that mechanical improvement. 
That American inventors, given the incentive, would come up with 
something new was taken for granted. That labor scarcity and the hope 
of financial reward provided sufficient incentive traditionally closed the 
case. It came down to a neat triangle of shrewd capitalist, bold entre-
preneur and ambitious mechanic. In 1962 H. J. Habakkuk pulled the 
triangle out of shape a bit by arguing, in a well-documented monograph, 
that the conventional assumptions were oversimplified and that "dear 
labor," much more than "scarce labor," accounted for the inventive 
set of the American factor endowment.3 The point conceded, we are 
still left with the essential weakness of economic historiography. The 
unadorned pushes and pulls of supply and demand simply cannot be 
made to explain enough. Too much stretching must be done in order 
to fit everything in. The blank assertion, for instance, that capital accu-
mulation will automatically result in technological advancement obscures 
more about processes of human invention than it illuminates. 
A third school of interpretation might be called "behavioral." Be-
havioral arguments are many and varied—and often eclectic—ranging 
from abstract questions of social motivation to such mechanical factors 
as the patent law, but a focus of sorts can be found in a general emphasis 
on institutions and their shaping influence. John Sawyer came close to 
the crux of the behavioral approach by presenting a list of social and 
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cultural attributes which accounted, as he believed, for the distinctiveness 
of American technology: 
[There were] differences in the nature and diffusion of 
education in America; the absence of rigidities and restraints 
of class and craft; the freedom from hereditary definitions of 
the tasks or hardened ways of going about them; the high 
focus on personal advancement and drives to higher ma-
terial welfare; and the mobility, flexibility, adaptability of 
Americans and their boundless belief in progress. These 
and closely related patterns are linked directly to economic 
behavior and economic results—to initiative, originality, 
systematic effort, and boldness; the "eager resort to machin-
ery" and productive use of small capital, at a time when 
small capital was decisive; the ceaseless search and ready 
adoption of the new and more efficient; the intense respon-
siveness to shifting opportunities and expanding horizons; 
the "go-aheadism" that visitors from all categories so often 
placed at the root of the "immense drive" of American 
manufacturing.4 
There is much to be said for the ideas of the behavioralists. They 
bring us closer to a satisfying account of the indefinables and imponder-
ables of the technological puzzle, something that has eluded the econo-
mists. Yet something else is missing. With all of the well-honed linkages 
between technology and "American mission," or technology and "in-
dustrial consciousness," or technology and "democracy," there is still to 
be answered the question of why a certain plexus of changes—of which 
technological advancement is only one—takes place at a given time, in a 
given place, and by a given manner.5 Often, what the behavioralists have 
succeeded in doing is documenting the complexity and interrelatedness 
of it all—without exactly explaining it. 
If the behavioralists failed to tackle the most difficult issues, the 
defect has been corrected, and perhaps overcorrected, by my last category 
of writers. Historians who attribute American technology to native 
mechanical genius have thought in large terms. All want to trace the 
roots of that genius back into broad physical or geographical aspects 
of the national experience. Where behavioralists found historical ex-
]3lanations in the character of institutions, environmentalists find them 
in nature itself, and in its impact upon the human personality. Roger 
Burlingame, following Frederick Jackson Turner, found the ultimate 
explanation to be the American frontier. Where else would the Euro-
pean artisan be plunged back into a state of nature, be stripped of his 
Old-World preconceptions and find himself confronted by unheard-of 
technological problems? And where else would he encounter that endless 
winter solitude in which he was left free to whittle and tinker and 
scheme? "He came from crowds and found himself alone; his thought 
was translated from inches into miles, from little bounded squares into 
acres with vague lines. At the edge of the wilderness, myopia left him 
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forever."6 As with the behavioral approach, there were several varia-
tions possible. American exceptionalism has been characterized by John 
Kouwenhoven as a rediscovery of "the truth of function," by D. L. Burn 
as a cumulative process of "selective immigration," and by Daniel Boor-
stin as an omnicompetence bred of seafaring, this last an interesting twist 
on the Turnerians.7 In every case, though, it was American geography 
which was under consideration and "American genius" as the outcome. 
Just how compelling is the idea of an American "inventive genius?" 
Historiographically, we have been given a choice of three ways to explain 
—or perhaps explain away—its existence. At first blush, the three may 
seem rather disparate. Yet they are not altogether beyond reconciliation. 
For example, the respective categories of "economic," "behavioral" and 
"environmental," which may appear valid enough for taxonomical pur-
poses, are all rooted in a common assumption: that man is essentially a 
quiescent creature who, while able enough to create "inventions," must 
first be set into motion by some external inventive or penalty or, in the 
case of the behavioralists, by some reordering of the social mind. Each 
general theory, whether cast in terms of economic opportunity, environ-
mental demand, or the impact of social institutions, assumes a passive 
role for the intellect, at least at the outset, and thus implicitly suggests 
that invention, as a collective human endeavor, had once been inhibited. 
But why should this be? 
Here let me propose a modest hypothesis. Suppose that some sort of 
medieval inheritance tended to impede the processes of invention and dis-
covery, and that because of this inheritance, a kind of inertial threshold 
had to be reached and crossed before the technological revolution could 
begin. If this were true, then the key to understanding "inventiveness" 
might be found in the various ways in which Western society has broken 
with its pre-industrial past—and the key to understanding American 
exceptionalism might be found in the unique, not to say revolutionary, 
way in which that break was effected on this continent. 
What I am proposing is not precisely a new interpretation as such, 
but rather a context in which to place the interpretations we already 
possess. What I would attempt to explain is why these interpretations 
presently seem to lack causal sufficiency: why, granting the economic 
school its due, American inventiveness existed before the era of capital 
intensity and after the era of labor dearness; or, to change the argument, 
why liberal institutions did not bring "Yankee ingenuity" to the Amer-
ican South; or, to change it again, why the challenges of the frontier did 
not mechanize New France. And the best answer might be that none of 
these factors by itself could sustain a climate of technological innovation 
so long as the characteristic intellectual response to the stimulus in ques-
tion was passive. So long as Western Man lived in a world which he was 
not encouraged to alter, obstructions and incentives could not liberate 
his inventive impulses. Thus, what is needed from the historiographical 
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standpoint is a new long-range perspective (as opposed to a short-term 
explanation), and the way to achieve it might be by calling attention to 
that elusive element of dynamism which, in the space of a century or 
two, transformed Western Man from a passive, medieval figure who 
accepted the world as he found it, into a restless, kinetic figure who 
sought to impose upon the world his own sense of order. By such a 
minor theoretical adjustment, we might alter our conception of the 
technological revolution from an abstract play of external forces to an 
intensely human—and even morally significant—event. And it seems to 
me that only in such an altered frame of reference do our various ex-
planations of "revolution" really become operative. Only within the 
context of an intellectual upheaval does the concept of a technological 
upheaval make sense. Only in bridging the psychological gap between, 
say, Hamlet and Faust do we glimpse the missing component of inven-
tion, and thus bridge the semantic gap between Necessity and Response. 
Once this much is granted, I believe it can then be shown how each 
school of technological history illuminates an important dimension of 
the complex reality. 
The key to the problem lies in the impact of social breakdown upon 
human behavior. When we speak of preindustrial or "traditional" so-
ciety, we use catchwords which, though related to structure, describe as 
well the effects of structure upon the mind. Words like "commonwealth," 
"hierarchy," and "deference" convey not only a description of life but also 
something of its inner meaning. Basically it was a meaning which em-
bodied three ideals: Christian brotherhood, patriarchal order, and, above 
all, continuity. There was both a seamlessness and timelessness about the 
preindustrial "corporate commonwealth" that commended its inhabitants 
to a repose which modern man would find stultifying. Yet these psycho-
logical concomitants of traditional life did not vanish overnight. Al-
though corporate societies themselves began to disintegrate long before 
the Renaissance, their consciousness and value structure lingered on 
erratically in Western thought. This was especially true of Northwestern 
Europe, where, amid island fragments and physical ruins of the old 
order, the ethos of traditional life continued to haunt the landscape well 
into the nineteenth century. Though the influence of this ethos was felt 
in many ways, the most significant was in the "deference community"— 
the tendency for individuals in modern industrial society to identify 
themselves with some surrogate for the old corporate commonwealth. 
Throughout the early nineteenth century, the deference community 
usually existed within a surviving manor or rural parish, but in the city 
as well as the country deference patterns also appeared, as workers in 
mine or factory clustered themselves into imaginary "commonwealths," 
paid various kinds of homage to patriarch figures, and, in psychological 
terms at least, continued to live very comfortably in the past.8 This 
phenomenon and the interpersonal values it helped keep alive must have 
exerted a profound impact upon the course of European technology. 
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The American case, as one might expect, was distinguished by a rela-
tive absence of the traditional ethos, partly because of the difficulties of 
transplanting it, and partly because even when planted firmly, as in the 
Puritan "commonwealths'' of Massachusetts, it could not long survive. 
In the New World atmosphere of makeshift and disarray, a combination 
of economic, institutional and environmental influences worked to loosen 
the bonds of community, rupture the status hierarchy, and atomize the 
"organic" structure of society—and in America there were no thatched 
cottages or ivied ruins to call back the lost mystique. Moreover, the 
immigration ]Drocess itself tended to skim off the more rootless types and 
transport them to these shores. By the eighteenth century the colonies 
had become a locus of activity and movement, of competitive behavior, 
of social fluidity and cultural pluralism—a place where, as Cadwallader 
Colden put it, "the only principle of life . . . is to get money." It re-
mained for the American Revolution, with its heady renunciation of 
political corporatism, and the subsequent "rise of the common man" to 
complete the dissolution of intellectual traditionalism. To be sure, the 
community remained upon the American landscape, but the medieval 
aura of community life, with its sense of harmony and balance, had been 
destroyed. Its disintegration, in part, released that intense energy for 
which the "Jacksonians" were to become known and through which the 
American spirit of innovation was to acquire its kinesthesia. 
Specifically, the rapid collapse of deferential order could have af-
fected the consciousness and behavior of what I will call the Inventive 
Man in several ways. A few of them might be listed in the overlapping 
categories which follow. 
i 
individualism 
The truly creative person must have a strong sense of his own indi-
viduality. If his identity is bound too securely to the larger society, 
chances are that he will defer to the aims and traditions of that society, 
and will avoid innovations which, however beneficial to himself, would 
throw time-honored relationships out of balance. As an autonomous in-
dividual, on the other hand, he will become emancipated both from the 
corporate interest and the confinement of tradition. He will become 
more mobile, more versatile, and more self-confident, trusting his own 
observations and intuitions more than the conventional wisdom of the 
day. 
Individualism, so described, was a prominent feature of the early 
American industrial milieu. One striking evidence of it was found 
in the prevailing attitude toward "craftsmanship." Craftsmanship, of 
course, was the hallmark of the ancient guild system, and it was passed 
along reasonably intact to the trade unions which in Europe replaced 
that system. There was, apparently, very little of it to be found in 
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America. British observers constantly called attention to the want of 
"perfect skill" and to the crudity and fiimsiness of American construc-
tion.^ Often as not, machinery which in Britain was made of heavy 
metal and finished to gleaming perfection was in America made of wood, 
was "much simplified/' and was, according to the standards of the day, 
rough-hewn at best. Yet, such jerrybuilding had its advantages. It cost 
less, required less time, and the item in question could be discarded 
more easily for an improved model. Moreover, the American de-emphasis 
of "craftsmanship" led to a corresponding emphasis of function—and 
efficiency. Only those parts of an engine for which "good fitting and 
fine workmanship are indispensable to the efficient action" were highly 
finished, commented David Stevenson; everything else was left "coarse." 
But this directness was a source of strength, allowing the American tool-
men to get straight to the point. "There is a great simplicity, almost a 
quakerlike rigidity of form given to the [American] machinery," reported 
James Nasmyth; "no ornamentation, no rubbing away of corners, or 
polishing; but the precise, accurate, and correct results."11 Thus, the 
Gilpin paper machine, copied after John Dickinson's English cylinder, 
was much simplified, more easily constructed, and wholly adaptable to 
the vagaries of local conditions. The American standard, or "Sellers," 
thread was by comparison to the English a hopelessly rustic affair, re-
quiring but one cutter, one lathe and no craft skill at all to achieve its 
60° angle. But precisely because it was so pedestrian, the American 
standard helped bring about interchangeability and mass production.12 
Similarly, the American cut nail and pointed screw violated craft notions 
of wrought perfection, while they immensely simplified basic processes. 
Even the sizes and shapes and costs of things could be tyrannized by the 
craft tradition, as Chauncey Jerome discovered when he attempted to 
mass-produce clocks: it was not the technical problem that stymied him; 
it was the social unacceptability of an inexpensive timepiece.13 
Some inventions not only circumvented the craft tradition—they flew 
in the face of it. The Blanchard lathe, for example, which was developed 
for the making of gunstocks, brought together sixteen different machines 
for the turning of an irregularly shaped object. The essential point 
about this remarkable tool is that its sequence of steps did not correspond 
to human actions, nor did the individual lathes correspond to the car-
penter's customary tools. It required a visualization de novo of both 
object and process in order to achieve such a breakthrough.14 Then too 
it was the craft tradition that in Europe inhibited the process of rational-
izing production. Where outwork and handicraft methods prevailed, 
artisans remained content—nay, adamant—to do their own traditional 
job, carefully isolating one step of production from another. At first 
Almy & Brown, like its European counterparts, respected such disjointed-
ness. But soon the firm discovered that resident weavers under the 
supervision of mill operatives could produce cloth with many-fold greater 
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efficiency and that their rate of production, which was now predictable, 
could be coordinated to that of yarn. In the absence of a strongly 
countervailing craft tradition, these discoveries quickly jelled into the 
"American System."15 It was little wonder that "traditional methods," 
as one observer put it, "had little hold upon the American as compared 
with the English artisan," and thus that "processes holding out the least 
promise of improvement were quickly tested."16 
Important as it was, the craft tradition—and its relative absence in 
America—was but one aspect of individualism. Another, certainly, was 
the dynamic impact of mobility. Exactly because the traditional crafts 
had no dominion in America, workers from all walks of life found them-
selves side by side. In Colt's factory, for example, "one had been a 
butcher, another a tailor, another a gentleman's servant. . . ,"17 Nor 
were they likely to pause long at a given pursuit. "The citizen of the 
United States," said Joseph Whitworth and George Wallace, "seems 
really to pride himself in not remaining over long at any particular 
occupation, and being able to turn his hand to some dozen different 
pursuits in the course of his life."18 Accordingly, they were not com-
fortable with too high a degree of specialization and insisted upon 
mastering the broad principles of the task at hand.19 Just what effect 
that mastery may have had can be seen in the high incidence of occupa-
tional mobility among the most gifted of the inventors. Matthias 
Baldwin, builder of locomotives, apprenticed as a jeweler and worked as 
an engraver and fine machinist before turning to steam technology. For 
George Henry Corliss, the path leading to the development of the 
Corliss engine wound through storekeeping, drafting and bootmaking. 
Charles Danforth tried soldiery, sailing and schoolteaching before in-
venting the "cap spinner" for the cotton industry; he went on to build 
machine tools and eventually locomotives. Three careers were especially 
involuted: those of Jacob Perkins, Samuel Luther Dana and Eli Whitney 
Blake. Perkins, it seemed, laid a hand to almost everything, from re-
frigeration to bank-note engraving. Dana, a pioneer of industrial chem-
istry, began as a physician and variously sallied into a host of disciplines, 
including geology, agronomy and occasionally even medicine. Blake got 
his start in Uncle Eli's arms factory. Then he developed an improved 
lock, a new system of geared power transmission, and the Blake stone-
crusher, which made possible the American concrete industry. At the 
age of 92 he was studying aerodynamics and still going strong. The list 
goes on and on. Its point here is to demonstrate the startling versatility 
that grew out of constant change and adaptation. The jack-of-all-trades 
was a Rube Goldberg at heart. 
Of course, there was something more than adaptation at work too. 
American mechanics on their endless peregrinations were constantly 
talking to one another, exchanging ideas, cross-fertilizing from industry 
to industry. "The successful application of mechanical means to one 
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manufacture has been, as a matter of course, stimulative of their applica-
tion to another, however different. . . ," observed Wallis.20 To an extent 
unimaginable in Europe, the Americans traded successfully in both 
information and inspiration.21 Thus, the clock-makers, Eli Terry and 
Chauncey Jerome, learned from the arms-makers, their Connecticut 
neighbors. (Jerome, incidentally, learned from Terry as well, by apply-
ing the principles of wooden movements to brass.) Elisha King Root, the 
man who perfected Colt's marvelous machinery, got his start with the 
Collins brothers and adapted the principles of their ax manufactory to 
the production of six-shooters. Elias Howe got the idea of a sewing 
machine from his work on textile equipment. A few places became 
nerve centers in the dissemination of ideas. The machine tool industry 
sprouting up around Springfield, Vermont is one example. Almy & 
Brown, with its generations of prolific inventors, is another. But the 
clearest case of technological spin-off was to be seen at Lowell, where 
the perfection of textile machinery demonstrably led to machine tool 
production, to the development of locomotives, to the Worcester wire 
industry, and, through Jonas Chickering, to the wire piano. To be sure, 
some of this proliferation represented piracy of a sort, but most of it 
did not. From the extant records, the exchange of information in 
America—unlike Europe—seems to have been free, open and untram-
meled, for the most part, protected by a sense of national pride. Jacob 
Perkins, for example, kept the American mechanical world in a constant 
state of excitement, not with his accomplishments, which were meager, 
but with his ideas and his projects, which circulated as freely as advice 
to the lovelorn. This attitude of intellectual free trade was, according 
to Eugene Ferguson, America's secret weapon in the battle for tech-
nological supremacy.22 
ii 
egalitarianism 
It was not enough to release the Inventive Man from the constraints 
of a tradition-minded society. He had to become convinced of his own 
human worth as well. He had to be able to approach any of his con-
temporaries with any idea and be given a hearing. He had to believe in 
himself to the extent of assuming considerable personal risks, just as 
he had to persuade others to believe in him. All societies have their 
potentially creative individuals, the would-be or could-be Inventive Men. 
And, if these are fortuitously situated, they may stand a fair chance of 
seeing their dreams come true. But only the fortuitously situated—most 
of the others will carry their great notions to the grave. Here it is well 
to note what Crevecoeur observed about the effect of the American 
experience upon the very sort of people who would soon be tending 
the lathes. "Every thing has tended to regenerate them; new laws, a 
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new mode of living, a new social system; here they are become men: in 
Europe they were as so many useless plants. . . ."23 
Indeed, it was probably no accident that the period of American 
technological take-off and the Age of the Common Man were one. What 
was said above about cross-fertilization, for example, could not have 
applied to a rigid and highly stratified social system, no matter how 
mobile geographically. Ideas had to be able to move up and down as 
well as outward. Similarly, the flexibility and adaptability of the Amer-
ican workingman was a reflection of his altered socio-political status, just 
as the division of labor, so prominent a feature of the European scene, 
was a reflection of the reverse. "Since the great mass are fitted to do one 
thing well/' said Wallis of the English mechanics, "the great fact of 
such sub-division must ever be imperatively insisted upon/'24 
Nowhere was the contrast more apparent than in the matter and 
significance of basic education. The British Commissioners who were so 
struck by the absence in America of an apprenticeship system were 
equally struck by the pervasiveness of public education. American 
mechanics, they noted, were "educated up to a far higher standard than 
those of a much superior social grade . . . in the Old World." The result, 
as they saw it, was a particular "vivacity" in "inquiring into the first 
principles" of things, a "theoretical knowledge of the processes," which 
stood in marked contrast to the European mechanics.25 The effects of 
free education have been extensively explored by John Sawyer and 
others, but the nexus between education and social fluidity needs more 
attention. One might note, for example, that within a brief span of 
time there sprung up in both England and America analogous institu-
tions of "industrial education" and analogous vehicles for disseminating 
information at large.26 But there was a crucial difference in the way 
these new developments related to the two societies respectively. In 
England, where craft and apprenticeship were still firmly entrenched, 
there is reason to believe that the mechanics institutes and technical 
journals merely supplemented the "real" instruments of education, which 
were found within the social order of the individual trades. But in 
America, where there was little of that order, the mechanics institutes, 
and especially the technical journals, received as they were by com-
paratively well-educated workingmen, might well have become the prin-
cipal means of industrial education and so produced a more "vivacious" 
working populous. In any case, in America, unlike England, the lack of 
education did not hold a man back. The chief repairman of the Globe 
Company in Tiverton, Rhode Island, was thirteen. Another boy, aged 
fifteen, was dispatched from Massachusetts to Burrillville, Rhode Island, 
to supervise the equipping of a mill there and to put it in operation. 
The superintendent of the Paw tucket Thread Company, aged nineteen, 
was a man with eleven years experience. While England certainly knew 
child labor, it could offer but few such examj)les as these. "Wherever 
education and an unrestricted Press are allowed full scope," said Wallis 
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with a touch of envy, "progress and improvement are the certain re-
sult. . . ,"27 
Democracy, to be sure, was more than free education, and a cata-
loguing of all possible forms of its influence is beyond the scope of this 
paper. It is well to note, however, that it was not just that in America 
there was a different spirit to invention. The inventions themselves 
were of a significantly different type. British ordnance officials, among 
many others, concluded that the kinds of machinery "usually employed 
by engineers and machine-makers''—let us say the "aristocratic" kinds— 
"were generally behind those of England." The great English lathes, 
the sophisticated planing, shaping and drilling machines, the very types 
of equipment that one would expect to find in use among the highly 
trained, were far in advance of their American counterparts. American 
innovation, in other words, was not really happening at the top—it was 
happening at the bottom, at the level of the ordinary workingman, who 
was applying "special apparatus to [the] single operation" before him.28 
This, at least, was the description given by the British Commissioners 
to the most wondrous of the American devices: 
A peculiar shaped screw augur. . . . Extensive rope spinning 
machinery. . . . An apparatus for cleaning metal. . . . A 
new sort of trip hammer. . . . A new sort of steam tilt ham-
mer. . . . Machine for polishing lasts. . . . A vertical saw, for 
cutting irregular forms. . . . An apparatus for testing the 
quantity of power required to work a machine. . . . A 
machine for sifting sand. . . . Patent magnetic sewing 
machine. . . . Yankee chaff cutter. . . . Tourbine water-
whell. . . . Machine for cutting files. . . Cask-making ma-
chinery . . . Packing-up machinery.29 
And the suspicion that a different, more "common," type of inventor 
was at work in America is clearly borne out not only by the specific 
instances we know of—the slide lathe, the cap spinner, the woodworking 
machines—but by the more significant fact that we know of so few: that 
so little of the work of the American inventors was at the time dignified 
as "invention" and passed along as such to posterity. One is hard pressed, 
in fact, to come up with any creation of the American mechanic-inventors 
truly analogous to those of the European scientist-engineers. Partly be-
cause their ambitions were high, partly because their jobs were secure, 
but partly too because they lived in an unfettered society, the American 
mechanics made a different kind of response to the problems they faced. 
They literally "bombarded" their employers with innovative suggestions, 
some of them outlandish, some of them brilliant.30 
Then too, in Jacksonian America the common man was becoming, 
in addition to a political phenomenon, a symbol of the Machine Age, 
the ideal person to embrace mechanism and make it respond, and as 
such he was culturally encouraged to express his creativity as few creative 
people have ever been. In less than two generations these halcyon days 
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would vanish, and the common man would be counted a Machine-Age 
casualty. But in those few decades when labor was dear and machinery 
new, it was doubly fortunate for the workingman that a new phase of 
American folk myth coincided with that stage of Western technological 
development in which "tinkering" on a broad front could produce 
astonishing results—as it never could before or would again. 
ambition 
A favorable economic climate undoubtedly supplies the "opportu-
nity" necessary to stimulate innovation. But in order to perceive oppor-
tunity as such, one must first possess certain kinds of ambition, and one 
must feel that certain ways of gratifying that ambition are "acceptable." 
Thus, the mother of invention is not necessity in the abstract—that is, 
capital intensity or labor bottlenecks—but a widespread eagerness to 
get ahead in the world and a widespread belief that "ingenuity" provides 
an acceptable way of doing it. Where traditional society, with its order 
and stability, could offer only limited avenues for individual advance-
ment, modern society, with its imbalance and fluidity, makes advance-
ment a personal obligation and endlessly multiplies the "acceptable" 
avenues for it. One result is the idea of the Inventive Man, who makes 
his way not by wealth or position, but by boldness, shrewdness, and 
"ingenuity." 
In order for the idea to become a working reality, it had to be em-
bodied in specific role-models, and these, in order to fire the ambitions, 
had to possess a distinct rags-to-riches appeal. Such was the folklore of 
American invention. The humble origins and proud achievements of 
the "great" inventors has been sung often enough to preclude review 
here. Suffice it to say that the Fords and the Edisons and the Wrights 
and the Bells were one and all middle-class people lacking the advantage 
of a high-powered education. But what about the second and third eche-
lons of American inventors, and what about those anonymous tinkerers 
who added bits and pieces here and there? An exhaustive study of such 
figures and their movements along the socio-economic scale would be a 
valuable asset for technological historiography, but, to my knowledge, 
it is an asset we still lack. On the other hand, such information as we do 
have points clearly to the conclusion that "inventiveness" was indeed 
widely regarded as one of the principal routes upward. "You may be 
sure," de Tocqueville wrote, "that the more democratic, enlightened, 
and free a nation is. . . , the more will discoveries immediately applicable 
to productive industry confer on their authors gain, fame, and even 
power."31 
So let me pass over the Fords and the Edisons and try to give some 
indication of how the less well-known served as exemplars of success. 
Samuel and David Collins were Hartford blacksmiths who, in the 1820s, 
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succeeded in mechanizing the production of axes—and eventually came 
to command a world-wide market. Ichabod Washburn, a mechanic of 
Worcester, began experimenting with wire production in the early 1830s; 
he became the father of the American wire industry and one of the early 
industrial giants of Massachusetts. John Brandt, another blacksmith, 
this time from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, began puttering with automa-
tion, became master mechanic of the Erie Railroad and eventually set 
up his own locomotive works. The Merrimack area fairly sparkled with 
Cinderella stories. There was Paul Moody, a weaver from Newbury, 
who after convincing Francis Cabot Lowell of his mechanical genius, 
was made superintendent of the Waltham Corporation. Or there was 
Samuel Batchelder, another textile mechanic, who invented the dyna-
mometer and went on to become manager and president of the Hamilton 
Company. A Lowell physician who began wondering about the use of 
cow dung as a bleaching agent wound up as the chief chemist of the 
Merrimack Manufacturing Corporation. The examples could be multi-
plied endlessly: Joseph Glidden, the farmer, invents barbed wire and 
becomes a millionaire; Solomon Willard, the stone cutter, devises new 
quarrying techniques and establishes the Vermont granite industry; 
Danforth, the schoolteacher, and Baldwin, the jeweler, develop new 
machine tools and become the founders of rival manufacturers; Eli Terry, 
the peddler, perfects interchangeable parts and dies among the richest 
men in America. And so forth. 
What was uniquely American about all of this? For one thing, its 
ubiquity. We are not dealing with limited areas or isolated instances, 
but rather with a pattern that by 1850 had become recognized and well-
established. The example, in other words, of "ingenious men who have 
solved economic and mechanical problems to their own profit and eleva-
tion" was, in the words of one British toolman, "constantly before" the 
American mechanic, engendering a "restless activity of mind and body," 
an "anxiety to improve his own department": 
It may be said that there is not a working boy of average 
ability in the New England states, at least, who has not an 
idea of some mechanical invention or improvement in 
manufactures by which, in good time, he hopes to better 
his position, or rise to fortune and social distinction.32 
But even more distinctive is the fact that in America personal ambition 
came first—literally taking precedence over order and stability. Con-
sider the matter of pulling up stakes. Since contracts customarily re-
quired the mechanic to renounce patent rights to his own discoveries, he 
was left with but two alternatives: to accept a gratuity of some kind as 
fair recompense for his new idea, or to take the idea, whatever it was, 
and bolt from the company. Ambition made him choose the latter, 
routinely. Thus, when Chauncey Jerome had mastered Terry's secrets 
and knew that he could apply them to a slightly different process, he 
went out on his own. Seth Thomas, another Terry prodigy, did the 
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same, and wound up buying out his mentor's company. Sam Slater, in 
whose incredible memory the Arkwright machinery was smuggled into 
the United States, came in for a surprise when the mill hands he had 
patiently schooled suddenly revolted, devised their own machinery, and 
set up a host of rival manufacturies. George Henry Corliss was working 
for Fairbanks, Bancroft & Co. when he got the idea for his improved 
steam engine valve; the result was not a promotion within the existing 
corporation, but the formation of Corliss, Nightingale 8c Co. in 1848. 
Elisha King Root departed from Collinsville with his hard-won ideas 
and sold himself, as it were, to the highest bidder, Samuel Colt. A 
Scotch mechanic who had worked for the Waltham Company discovered 
one group of his shopmates running their own mill in the South and 
another operating a factory at Medway. Similarly did the machine-tool 
industry around Springfield, Vermont proliferate, while Almy & Brown, 
as noted above, became a veritable hothouse for mechanical improve-
ment. Moreover, if the gifted mechanic was hesitant in the least about 
cutting his ties, there were plenty of others to encourage him. Kirk 
Boott, for one, was a talent scout of rare ability, annually scouring the 
country and bringing to Lowell inventors at whatever price he had to 
pay. Where advancement within the system was impossible, in other 
words, Americans driven by ambition were willing to abandon the 
system itself. This looseness stands in direct contrast to Europe, where 
a man's job was a settled part of his community experience, and where 
there was, as one European confessed, "a certain degree of timidity re-
sulting from traditional notions, and attachment to old systems."33 
Also unlike his European contemporaries, the American mechanic 
did not think of himself as a permanent wage earner, not before mid-
century, at least.34 His career at labor was seen only as a tour of duty, a 
preparation for the greater things to come. And come they did for so 
many of his acquaintances that, as Wallis remarked, he had an example 
of success constantly before his eyes. Whatever else the spirit of equality 
bequeathed him, it generated, as de Tocqueville noted, "an all-pervading 
and restless activity, a super-abundant force, and an energy which is 
inseparable from it. . . . " Such activity, force and energy, he added, 
could "produce wonders."35 
iv 
open-endedness 
Traditional society existed in a closed and finished universe within 
which it was not only futile but, in a sense, blasphemous to advocate 
change. Men lived and died within a system of relationships so well 
ordered as to make all innovation glacial, rarely perceptible. From the 
disordering of this society there resulted a new image of the universe, 
one of openness and contingency. Nature gradually lost its medieval 
sanctity and became malleable to the hand of man. Traditional values, 
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like faithfulness, honor and charity, were eclipsed by the more utilitarian 
values of industriousness and creativity. And "invention"—the filling 
out of the cosmos of possibilities—became something like an end in itself. 
Nowhere was open-endedness more evident than in the American 
attitude toward change. Indeed, the words "change" and "improve-
ment" appeared to be synonyms in the national cultural idiom. John 
Anderson of the Ordnance Department was only one of a host of British 
observers who commented upon "the avidity with which any new idea 
is laid hold of, and improved upon," a spirit, he added, which was 
"occasionally carried to excess."36 "Everything new is quickly introduced 
here, and all the latest inventions," wrote Friedrich List in the 1820s. 
"There is no clinging to the old ways, the moment an American hears 
the word 'invention* he pricks up his ears."37 The very word was magic. 
This, of course, was only natural in what John L. O'Sullivan termed 
"the great nation of futurity."38 After all, America was, as Harvard 
Professor Levi Frisbie said in 1818, "full of youthful freshness. We are 
free from any of those institutions by which other nations are en-
thralled."39 He doubtless agreed with Noah Webster that "Europe is 
grown old in folly, corruption, and tyranny—in that country laws are 
perverted, manners are licentious, literature is declining, and human 
nature is debased."40 On the other hand, "Many hundred years must roll 
away before we shall be corrupted," John Adams confided to his friend 
Jefferson, adding, "Our pure, virtuous, public spirited, federative re-
public will last forever, govern the globe and introduce the perfection 
of man."41 What this all amounted to was, if not an unqualified self-
confidence exactly, certainly an unqualified confidence in the future. 
As O'Sullivan put it, "We are the nation of human progress, and who 
will, what can, set limits to our onward march?" 
This optimism is usually recalled in political terms, but there is no 
evidence that contemporaries so conceived it. In 1797 Joseph Perkins 
predicted that America would become "the seat of Muses, the Athens 
of our age, the admiration of the world."42 The nation would, said 
Jeremy Belnap of New Hampshire, "shine Mistress of the Sciences, as 
well as the Asylum of Liberty."43 Timothy Walker was still more 
specific: "We do entertain an unfaltering belief in the permanent and 
continued improvement of the human race, and we consider no small 
portion of it, whether in relation to the body or the mind, as the result 
of mechanical invention."44 But it was probably Samuel Colt who put 
the American case most succinctly. "There is nothing," he said, "that 
cannot be produced by machinery."45 
Destiny, progress, machinery, they were inextricably connected in a 
logical sequence which only the despair of the twentieth century could 
undo. It was a logic particularly appropriate to the spirit of innovation. 
De Tocqueville observed that "from a conviction that their country is 
unlike any other and that its situation is without precedent in the 
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world," Americans look upon theirs as "a land of wonders, in which 
everything is in constant motion and every change seems an improve-
ment."46 An example or two will illustrate his point. The Americans 
altered everything, constantly, almost compulsively. There was an 
"American design" of the merchant vessel, an "American design" of the 
locomotive and an "American design" of the reaper.47 Some of the 
handiest of the American "inventions," like the Blake stonecrusher, 
were simply New World versions of European tools. Others, like the 
Gilpin paper cylinder or the Corliss steam engine, presented modifica-
tions so essential that they vastly improved the original. The water 
turbine was invented by the French, but only in the hands of such restless 
Yankees as Uriah Boy den did it revolutionize water-power utilization. 
But the striking example was the Maudslay lathe slide rest. Smuggled 
out of England at great cost and against impressive odds, the slide rest 
was worth a king's ransom to its new owners, for independent efforts to 
duplicate it had failed repeatedly. Yet, no sooner had they wiped the 
sweat from their brows than they consigned the new wonder to the 
Mason and Tyler Machine Shop—for alteration and "improvement." 
Open-endedness accounts not only for the pace of American inven-
tion, but for its idiosyncrasies as well. Because the Americans worked 
in a universe of boundless possibilities, their artifacts had a certain 
boundlessness about them. Everything was bigger and faster and more 
powerful. When George Escol Sellers was taken, at his request, to see 
the boring machine on which the largest steamboat engine in England 
was being honed, he was disappointed. "The cylinder struck me as a 
mere pigmy compared with the cylinders of the North River and Long 
Island Sound boats." Pigmies also were the lathes of the celebrated 
Maudslay Machine Shops—not half the size of his father's in Phila-
delphia.48 Scale became a kind of quest. As each new engine edged by 
its precedessor in bore and stroke and horsepower, the American tool-
men unconsciously embarked on an odyssey which even now the world 
fails to comprehend. Their ne plus ultra was John Ericsson's mammoth 
"caloric" engine. Fourteen feet in diameter and eight feet long, its 
cylinders were, said the proud mechanics of Hogg 8c Dalamater, the 
largest attempted anywhere, a boast which is still true. That the machine 
itself did not work seemed somehow less important. At any rate, its 
beautifully-crafted zaniness nicely illustrates the American spirit of im-
provement "carried to excess."41) 
Transcending the limitations of size was but one way of transcending 
the limitations of history. There were others. Many of the classical 
American inventions departed conspicuously from the one-step-at-a-time 
process of development so characteristic of European engineering. They 
literally sailed off into the unknown—often with results like Ericsson's. 
In the case of the Tudor-Wyeth ice-harvesting equipment or the recipro-
cating mortising machines, there was more than a touch of plain naivete 
in the American leap, and yet, somehow, contrary to all sophisticated 
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expectations, the contraptions worked. What struck the British Com-
missioners repeatedly—and with considerable impact—was just this: 
that the Americans were not doing the next logical thing in a process of 
gradual improvement, but doing something unheard of and unexpected. 
The woodworking machines in particular were startling in their con-
ceptual novelty.50 Like the Blanchard lathe, the Evans flour mill and 
the Fulton steamboat (and unlike the Fitch, which didn't work), they 
did not duplicate a familiar manual process so much as they transformed 
it into something new. 
Even the design of the American machines reflected discontinuity. 
It was, after all, the Americans who first scrapped the scrollwork and 
filigree and made the machine stand forth in the starkness of functional 
simplicity. "There is no country in the world," said Oscar Wilde in 
1883, "where machinery is so lovely as in America: 
I have always wished to believe that the line of strength 
and the line of beauty are one. That wish was realized 
when I contemplated American machinery. It was not 
until I had seen the waterworks at Chicago that I realized 
the wonders of machinery; the rise and fall of the steel 
rods, the symmetrical motion of great wheels is the most 
beautifully rhythmic thing I have ever seen.51 
This was more than a new esthetic. It was a new and open-ended imag-
ination. It was Eli Whitney and Mark Twain, Samuel Colt and Louis 
Sullivan, Thomas Edison and Charles Sheeler, all rolled into one. And 
"mechanism" lay at the very heart of it. 
In 1885 Henry James looked back upon the United States ante-
bellum, and saw a land which had: 
No sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, 
no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic service, no 
country gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, nor manors, 
nor old country houses, nor parsonages, nor thatched cot-
tages, nor ivied ruins; no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little 
Norman churches; no great universities nor public 
schools . . . ; no literature, no novels, no museums, no pic-
tures, no political society. 
In short, a land with no past. Though in some ways the indictment was 
unfair, the America of Andrew Jackson had undeniably divested itself 
of an Old-World past which, as James suggested, still lived on in Europe. 
In truth, the American experience can be described as a revolution 
against the past, a revolution in which the trappings of the Christian 
corporate commonwealth were cast aside in favor of a newness whose 
implications are with us still. It is, I believe, against the backdrop of 
this revolution that we can see most clearly the context in which 
American technological progress, American "inventiveness," cut itself 
away from the larger processes of the western industrial revolution and 
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adopted an independent course. It is within this ambience of disorder 
and reorder that we can appreciate most clearly how the abundance of 
the American environment, the advantages of a favorable economic 
endowment and the opportunities afforded by progressive institutions 
could each contribute to the American "inventive genius." Thus, it 
becomes clear that while science and engineering in this country could 
lag far behind European standards of the day, it is still fair to appraise 
the "genius" as genuine: for in terms of playing out the Industrial Revo-
lution to its logical consequences—both for good and evil—the brash, 
rough-hewn, Faustian society of the early republic had few peers. By 
the time of Henry Ford, as Aldous Huxley foresaw, America had truly 
become the land of the future, where the machine might well yet be king. 
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